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China in Africa: the Human Rights Impact 
Executive Summary 
Christa Bennett 
 
This report examines the practical impact of Chinese investment on human rights in 
Africa, in order to assess how the positive effects of China in Africa can be maximised 
and how the negative effects – which have the potential to be particularly damaging in 
states that may already be experiencing economic, political, and social upheaval – can be 
checked. 
 
In particular, this report addresses the recent debate over boycotting the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics in light of China’s complicity in the genocide in Darfur via its diplomatic, 
economic, and military support of the Government of Sudan (GoS), and thus the GoS-
backed Janjaweed militia.   
  
This debate led Waging Peace to consider China’s increasing investment and trade with 
African states as a whole and its implications for the well-being of African citizens.  
While China’s involvement in Sudan is a clear example of the grave consequences of 
Chinese investment, there are other cases where the effects of China in Africa are not so 
obviously ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
  
China’s numerous infrastructure projects are certainly welcome on a continent where 
improved roads and railways could have a significant positive effect on the local 
economy.  On the other hand, many of the dams being constructed in Africa have had 
detrimental effects, including the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people.   
  
Waging Peace believes that the best means of maximising China’s positive influence is 
for African leaders to use investment and trade agreements with China to guarantee a fair 
deal for their own people. However, in cases where African governments are unwilling to 
institute safeguards to ensure that local populations benefit from the investment, 
others must exploit China's desire to be seen as a respected member of the international 
community as leverage, putting the onus on China to make fair deals that promote human 
rights in African states. 
  
Waging Peace therefore recommends that: 
  
• All parties interested in Chinese investment in Africa must recognise that the promotion 
and protection of human rights, as laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and in the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is an integral 
commitment of states acting in good faith as members of the international community. 
• African state leaders must ensure that all financial agreements on behalf of their states 
fulfil the criteria of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, namely, 
Article 21.1, that “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. 
This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a 
people be deprived of it.” 
• Positive steps taken by Chinese state and business officials should be publicised, as a 
means of holding them accountable for their promises and to encourage them to follow 
through on declarations of support for human rights and socially responsible principles. 
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• The 2008 Olympics in Beijing should be leveraged to highlight continuing human rights 
abuses to which China’s financial and political support have contributed and to call for 
more responsible action by China. 
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I. Introduction 
Christa Bennett & Sophie McCann 
 
In recent years, China has strengthened its economic ties with Africa, with colossal 
investments in natural resource extraction, oil, infrastructure projects, construction, textile 
and other commodity sectors. In 2007, trade between the two actors reached $65 billion.1 
China’s return to Africa for the long-term has been regarded by many as “the most 
dramatic and important factor in the external relations of the continent – perhaps in the 
development of Africa as a whole – since the end of the Cold War.”2 
 
In light of these developments, China in Africa: the Human Rights Impact examines 
China’s increasing presence throughout Africa, in order to analyse the practical impact of 
Chinese investment on human rights in the continent. 
 
Referring to ‘China in Africa’ can be problematic, as African states are individual and 
differ greatly from one another, and likewise, China’s investment policies and the nature 
of its relationship with African governments vary among states.  Yet, there also exist 
similarities, and with the aforementioned limitations in mind, this report attempts to 
weigh the possibilities for good – and harm – that exist through Chinese financial 
investment in Africa.   However, as the subject of China’s investments in Africa is 
complex and vast in scope, this report should be viewed as an introductory overview of 
the topic. 
 
For instance, China’s strict adherence to the foreign policy principle of ‘non-interference’ 
has allowed China to turn a blind eye in cases where Chinese investment has contributed 
to the ability of African governments to perpetrate human rights violations.  Furthermore, 
in some countries, Chinese investment in mega-infrastructure projects has caused 
widespread human displacement; rampant natural resource extraction has had severe 
environmental and social and economic impacts; Chinese companies often propagate lax 
labour, health and safety standards; and the flood of Chinese businesses into African 
markets has strangled many indigenous businesses.   
 
On the other hand, in some African states, Chinese companies have employed and trained 
local labour; Chinese companies have speedily built desperately needed infrastructure, 
such as roads, railways, housing, power stations, which is essential for the economic and 
social development of Africa.   
 
This report further discusses the spectrum of positive and negative effects of Chinese 
investment on human rights and, in the concluding recommendations, outlines ways in 
which the former can be better achieved 
 
China in Africa: the Human Rights Impact is divided into three main chapters. ‘Sino-
African Relations: A recent history’ provides an overview of Sino-African relations in 
recent decades in order to place the present day situation into context.  ‘China, Africa, and 
Human Rights’ is divided into four sections: Trade and Commodity Markets; 
Infrastructure and Innovation; Labour Force and Education; and Aid.  After outlining 
Chinese investment in these areas, an analysis is made of its impact on human rights in 
Africa. Examples from individual African states are used throughout the second chapter. 
However, ‘China in Sudan’ examines how Chinese activities in Sudan have had 
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particularly drastic consequences. ‘China in Sudan’ also includes a brief discussion of the 
2008 Beijing Olympics and Darfur.  
 
China in Africa: the Human Rights Impact concludes that in order for human rights in 
Africa to be respected and upheld, Chinese financial investment must be properly and 
carefully implemented and, ideally, directed by Africans. Recommendations for ensuring 
that this happens are included as the final section of the report. 
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II.  Sino-African Relations: A recent history 
Ben Radley 
 
In 1421, before European involvement began in the west coast of Africa, the military 
leader Cheng Ho sailed to East Africa and established official relations at a number of 
portal towns, including Mombasa, Zanzibar, and Dar es Salaam3. More than 500 years 
later, China has become the world’s most populous country with one of the fastest 
growing economies and Africa the second-largest continent with the fastest growing 
population. By 2020 China and Africa are predicted to be home to 20% of the world’s 
people4. The re-emergence of China in Africa and current trends in Sino-African relations 
are sure to impact upon a significant number of the world’s population. 
 
In 2007, bilateral trade between China and Africa reached $65 billion, according to some 
sources.5  Beijing had invested approximately $6 billion in more than 900 projects in 
Africa by 2007 6.  Yet ‘there are very few historically informed analyses of [Sino-
African] relationships’7, despite the fact that forty years earlier, Sino-African relations 
were at an altogether different juncture to the one they find themselves at today. 
 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, politics was at the heart of the Sino-African relationship. As 
part of its geopolitical strategy, China challenged the major superpowers through its 
targeting of aid in Africa, and in return most African states recognised the recently 
formed People’s Republic of China (PRC)8. The construction of the TaZara (Tanzania-
Zambia) railway in 1975 by 25,000 Chinese technicians and 100,000 African labourers9 
came to symbolise this relationship of ‘South-South’ solidarity, and although markedly 
different now, China’s ‘practice then of supporting developing state initiatives and 
providing aid that did not enrich elites still resonates with Africans today’10. 
 
Towards the latter part of this period, signs of the shift that was to occur in Sino-African 
relations began to manifest themselves. China’s market-based economic reforms, begun 
in 1978, created a demand for raw materials and many manufacturers needing new 
markets abroad. Consequently, in the 1980s South Africa and Mauritius actively 
encouraged Taiwanese firms and Chinese investment by establishing export processing 
zones and, in the case of South Africa, decentralising industry11. 
 
Since 1978, China has averaged real GDP growth of 9.67% per year, consistently 
recording more than 8%12. Such sustained levels of economic growth make for a 
resource-hungry economy, and by the 1990s the developing economic relationship 
between China and Africa, hinted at in the previous decade, was starting to take off. The 
1990s saw the beginning of a steady and continued increase in bilateral trade between 
China and Africa, from less than $10 billion in 1996 to $55 billion by 2006;13 with much 
of this increase occurring since 2000.14  Significantly, China’s demand for African 
exports also surged, with the PRC share as a destination of such exports rising from 1.3% 
in 1995 to 9.3% in 200415.  
 
The turn of the Millennium saw another change of pace, with the first Ministerial 
Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in 
October 2000 marking the beginnings of a new era of Sino-African relations16. The 
conference emphasised common understanding on major international and political 
issues, as well as presenting ideas and cooperation in many areas, including the economy, 
trade, agriculture, and tourism. A number of important meetings have been held since, 
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including the China-Africa Business Council meeting of 2005 and the China-Africa 
Business Conference held in Egypt in 2007. These meetings have been accompanied by a 
continued proliferation of Chinese investment in Africa, with more than 800 Chinese 
companies active in the continent, and 750,000 Chinese working or living there as of 
January 200717. 
 
The significant shift in Sino-African relations over the last fifty years, from one of 
geopolitics to a more financially-based and motivated relationship, begs a number of 
questions. Does politics still have any role to play? Why is China so attracted to Africa as 
an area for investment? Similarly, what opportunities can Chinese investment offer 
Africa? 
 
In the first instance it would seem that, however diminished, the role of politics is still a 
relevant one. Whether or not African states choose to adhere to the ‘One-China’ policy, 
opposing any form of Taiwanese independence, can impact directly on their relationship 
with China.18 Recognition of Taiwan by an African state generally results in China 
officially refusing to do business with that country19. However, China appears to be more 
flexible the more beneficial the goods from any particularly country are. Hence China’s 
continued cotton trade with Burkina Faso, a country recognising Taiwan, alongside its 
refusal to deal with Gambia20, a country that also recognises Taiwan. Whilst still of 
importance, politics appears capable of being overshadowed by the dominance of China’s 
pragmatic, economic priorities. 
 
China’s selective pragmatism in such matters may be explained by the fact that China is a 
resource-low country, with a continually growing economy and domestic oil reserves set 
to last two decades at the current rate of consumption21. Thus, China is in desperate need 
to secure a range of resources in order to continue its current rates of growth, and 
consequently Africa’s vast resource-base is of great appeal. With 85% of the world’s new 
oil reserves found in 2001-2004 on west and central African coasts22, and China’s oil 
reserves rapidly diminishing, it is perhaps of little surprise that China is desperately keen 
to secure African oil. As of 2006, China was importing 28% of its oil and gas from Sub-
Saharan Africa23, with one third of its oil imports coming from the continent24. That 
Africa provides the world’s highest returns on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
averaging 29% in the 1990s and 40% in 200525, only encourages such activity. 
 
Africa, too, is attracted by the opportunity to benefit economically from its new 
relationship with China. Africa’s share of world trade decreased from 5% in the 1970s to 
1.5% in 2005, and its receipt of FDI from 30% in the 1980s to 7% in 2003.26 China’s 
financial investment in Africa is an opportunity to reverse these statistics. Furthermore, 
according to a Nigerian manager, China is desperate for African resources, which gives 
African countries a greater amount of agency in their discussions27. China’s low-tariff, 
low-subsidy regime also allows African countries to ‘export freely to China and compete 
with her in world markets’28, reflected by the recent significant increase in the amount of 
African exports to the PRC. What’s more, the lack of conditionality attached to Chinese 
aid is of particular appeal to African countries, especially following Africa’s experience 
of conditional and Western-dictated structural-adjustment programmes in the 1980s, as it 
allows for greater state agency in the sequencing and planning of development. 
However, there is more to Africa’s eagerness in attracting Chinese investment and aid 
than the potential for economic growth. In January 2006, China’s first comprehensive 
Africa strategy was published, emphasising support for both Africa’s development and its 
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efforts to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals. By 2006, China had cancelled 
the debt of more than thirty African states worth $1.36 billion, and further planned to 
cancel the interest-free loan debts owed by heavily indebted and least developed African 
countries;29 initiated more than 700 foreign aid projects, and trained thousands of 
Africans as medical or technical qualified personnel. A major attraction of Chinese aid 
for Africa is that rather than going to corrupt rulers, it is often used in the form of 
creating infrastructure30 which can bring tangible benefits to the general population. 
China’s recent $5 billion loan to the DRC is illustrative of this, as the money is set to pay 
for 3,200 kilometres of new railway lines, an equivalent amount of road, 31 hospitals, 
145 smaller health care centres, two large new universities, and 5,000 new government 
housing units31.  However, numerous social and environmental problems arise from 
Chinese-funded infrastructure projects such as population displacement, heavy pollution, 
lack of job creation and the destruction of the traditional way of life.  
Despite the recent proliferation of economic activity between China and Africa,  it is 
worth noting that foreign activity in Africa is and has long been a crowded stage with 
many actors, of which China is but one; even at today’s level of investment China is still 
Africa’s third largest trading partner, behind the USA and France. 32 Many analysts 
believe that when it comes to oil ‘the overall impact of Chinese companies in Africa will 
be limited because they do not have the financial power or technology to access the 
continent’s biggest oil fields, which are offshore’33.  Moreover, 58% of China’s oil 
imports currently come from the Middle East, with this expected to rise to 70% by 
201534, further suggesting the more limited role and impact for Chinese oil companies in 
Africa. 
 
However, the last five years have seen a significant increase in financial relations 
between Africa and China, and one not just limited to oil - a trend that is certain to 
continue. Although PRC trade with Africa in 2005 comprised of a small part of her $1.4 
trillion world trade, it is fast growing35. Only $10 billion in 2000, it had reached over $55 
billion by 2006. Many of the African states in which China is currently investing are 
fragile from conflict or poverty, or a combination of both, and as such are struggling to 
create or maintain a stable, much less democratising, government. Thus, any negative 
consequences arising from Chinese investment cannot be as easily offset by an efficient 
state welfare system, as they might be in other nations. The potential for Chinese 
investment to have a damaging impact on the poorest and most vulnerable people of the 
countries in which they invest is all too real, and as such, China’s rapidly increasing role 
in Africa, and the impact it could have on human rights in African countries, warrants a 
serious analysis. 
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III.  China, Africa, and Human Rights 
Asenath Mutumbi 
 
As China has made the shift from the geopolitical basis of its relationship with Africa in 
previous decades to one primarily focussed on financial investment, it has done so in 
diverse ways. The effects of Chinese investment is here evaluated through an 
examination of trade and commodity markets; infrastructure and innovation; the labour 
force and education; and aid. Obviously, there is some overlapping among these 
categories, but they provide a useful tool for analysis. 
 
Trade and Commodity Markets 
 
While the USA and France are currently Africa’s main trade partners,36 with the EU 
remaining China’s largest export market and China Europe’s largest source of imports37, 
trade between China and Africa is growing rapidly. Between 1999 and 2004, African 
exports to China grew by 48%, with annual rates increasing higher than that of any other 
region, including the European Union38.  By the end of 2007, trade between the two 
actors reached an estimated $65.9 billion.39 
 
Crude oil and natural gas, logs and minerals, referred collectively as ‘extractive’ sectors, 
constitute the largest share of commodities that Africa exports to China40. China’s main 
oil and gas suppliers in Africa include Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo.41 African states currently supply around 
one third of China’s oil,42 with Angola supplying half of this amount43. Chinese 
companies have also invested in oil exploration in Kenya, Chad, Gabon and Nigeria,44 
and have exploration and extraction licenses with Libya, Mauritania, Ethiopia and Sao 
Tome and Principe45.  
 
Examples of trade other than oil are also readily available. The trade volume between 
China and Gabon reached $300 million in 2003, 95% of which were Gabonese exports to 
China46. The main exports consist of petroleum, timber and manganese ores47. Congo is 
China’s forth most important trading partner, with trade value amounting to $2.423 
billion in 2005, of which Chinese exports totalled $145 million and the import value was 
$2.278 billion48.  In June 2006, Chinese Premier Wen signed seven accords on the 
Congo’s natural resources.49 Since 2003, China has continuously imported over 50% of 
Congo’s total global timber exports.50 Beijing has also gained access to Zimbabwe's wide 
variety of minerals, including platinum, gold, chrome, coal, nickel and diamonds.51 China 
has not only focused on booming industries but has also invested in sectors of African 
economies that have previously been deemed unprofitable and thus neglected by Western 
investors; the reopening of the Chambezi copper mines in Zambia is an example.52   
 
In turn, consumer products are the main Chinese imports to Africa. Principal Chinese 
exports include machinery, electrical equipment, garments, textiles, drugs, light industry 
products and metals.  
 
China also exports huge quantities of small arms to African nations. Chinese-
manufactured AK-47 assault rifles have been directly supplied to Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, and to third parties suppliers like 
Zimbabwe and Albania who have subsequently supplied Great Lakes states. 53  US 
Congressional figures state that between 2000 and 2004, China exported $200 million 
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worth of arms to Africa.54  China also provided military training in Mozambique and 
provided arms to Eritrea and Ethiopia in the late 1990s55. Small arms make up to 10% of 
total conventional arms China transferred to Africa between 1996 and 200356.  
 
Human Rights Consequences 
 
Trade with China has important benefits for Africa.  China is able to produce consumer 
goods more cheaply; thus, commodities such as textiles, electronics, and drugs are 
generally more affordable, enabling some middle-class Africans to save money in the 
short term.  If approved by the World Health Organisation, initiatives such as DanAdams 
Pharmaceuticals in Ghana under the Global AIDS Fund, which heavily relies on Chinese 
equipment, technicians, ingredients and additives, may provide timely and affordable 
generic drug alternatives for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and malaria.57 In a recent survey 
of Cameroonian opinion on Chinese presence, 81% of respondents said they welcomed 
the influx of Chinese goods into Cameroon.58 
 
Additionally, Chinese investment, through multinational corporate networks, may aide 
Africa’s participation in the global economy. This is implied by a recent World Bank 
study of 450 Chinese (and Indian) companies operating in four African countries: South 
Africa, Tanzania, Ghana, and Senegal. The study asserts that Chinese (and Indian) 
companies could help to facilitate the diversification of African exports, increase labour-
intensive production and processing and foster domestic competition in some African 
industries, which can boost their effective competition abroad.59  China’s demand for 
natural resources has led directly to an increase in global commodity prices, which has 
greatly benefited commodity exporting nations. 60 Through increased trade and returns, 
economic rights in African states may be more easily realised.  
 
On the other hand, the argument could be made that China is taking Africa’s natural 
resources, using them to produce commodities, then selling them back to Africa, thereby 
inhibiting the development of local resource-processing and manufacturing capacities, 
which contribute to the diversification of the economy, transformation of industry and 
higher-earning activities for local citizens.61 As Peter Navarro, author of The Coming 
China Wars, warily remarks, 
 
 "China goes in, builds the infrastructure, uses that country's infrastructure to 
extract their resources, takes those resources back to China, builds finished 
goods, then ships them back into that country to sell. It's a closed imperialistic 
loop, and the bottom line is poverty instead of prosperity in countries that have 
incredible natural wealth.”62  
 
Instead, China could be establishing long-term economic stability in Africa – and 
therefore better environments for Chinese investments – by helping African states 
develop their own capacity for turning resources into products. 
 
There are also numerous examples of cheap, subsidised Chinese products displacing the 
African manufacturing that does exist.63 The influx of Chinese textiles into Nigeria has 
resulted in only ten out of 170 Nigerian textile companies remaining in business64. 
Mulungushi Textiles is among the textile mills and other factories in Zambia that have 
suffered closures as cheaper Chinese goods flood the market, eliminating thousands of 
jobs in a country that desperately needs them65.  A meeting held in October 2005 with 
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trade union representatives from the textiles, clothing, leather and footwear sectors from 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa concluded that Africa lost more than 
250,000 jobs over the past few years, due to cheaper Chinese goods flooding African 
markets.66  
 
It should be noted that some Chinese companies are responding to criticism about their 
products eliminating domestic competition.  In response to demands made in South 
Africa, where the trade union federation called for a severe restriction on Chinese 
imports,67 China agreed to a quota restriction on its textile imports.68 However, with few 
African states introducing even such minimal policy measures, commodities continue to 
cripple African markets. 
 
Concerns also exist regarding the improper extraction of natural resources. For instance, 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London estimates that 70% of China’s 
timber import from Sub-Saharan Africa is illegal.69 It is highly unlikely that Chinese 
companies are abiding by responsible practices such as reforestation in their illegal 
forestry pursuits. Another example is Sinopec, who in 2006 was caught drilling illegally 
in Gabon’s protected Loango National Park,70 cutting down large swathes of forest and 
conducting oil exploration in areas that could damage the fragile ecosystem. In response, 
the Gabonese government announced that the law provided for extractive activities to 
occur in natural reserves, so that the area of natural reserve affected would be reassigned 
elsewhere. This indicates the importance of China as a trade partner to Gabon. 
Commentators have stated that “if China becomes Gabon’s dominant trade and aid 
partner we are likely to see Gabon revoke its environmental legislation or simply to turn 
a blind eye on environmentally destructive practices”71.  
 
Finally, participation in small arms trade raises serious human rights concerns. Small 
arms are in almost all contexts the preferred tools for committing serious violations of 
human rights, bearing responsibility for more crimes against humanity than any other 
type of weapon. These violations include deaths, injuries, rapes, abductions, torture, 
forced displacement and other attacks against civilian populations, and the pillaging of 
civilian goods.72  Arms supply to warring factions with stable and lootable economic 
resources has proven to prolong civil wars, sustain war economies, and make peaceful 
negotiations more difficult to achieve73. 
 
A majority of China’s trade partners in arms are currently embroiled in civil war or have 
experienced conflict in recent decades and remain in a post-conflict environment with a 
possibly tenuous peace. On several occasions, China has breeched arms embargoes of 
such states.  For example, China has supplied military equipment to Sudan, despite 
widespread and well-documented murders, rapes and torture by the government-allied 
Janjaweed militia in Darfur.74  
  
 
To date, China is the only major arms-exporting power that has not entered into any 
multilateral agreement that sets out trading criteria, including the respect for human 
rights, to guide arms export licensing decisions75.  
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Infrastructure and Innovation  
 
Until recently, Chinese trade with Africa mainly involved oil, natural gas, consumer 
commodities, and foreign acquisitions in related industries. However, Chinese 
investments are becoming more diverse. In 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) in a transaction worth 36.7 billion rand ($5.5 billion) partnered with South 
Africa’s Standard Bank, the largest banking group in Africa by assets76. Additionally, 
China is turning its attention towards infrastructural investment, and establishing Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs). 
 
China’s infrastructural investment in Africa involves constructing roads and bridges, 
railways, power and water supply plants, irrigation, telecommunication networks, 
healthcare centres, government and community buildings, football stadia, universities and 
housing. 
 
In 2003, China financed the construction of Gabon’s $34.9 million Senate Building.77 In 
2004, China agreed to construct the Gabonese National Assembly, two hospitals at 
Franceville and Libreville,78 petrochemical facilities, oil refineries and gas stations.79 In 
the Republic of Congo, China has taken on projects to build a new foreign ministry 
building in Brazzaville, soccer stadiums, textile mills, hospitals and roads, and has 
completed building a large radio and television network tower.80 In late 2006, China 
granted Nigeria a $2.5 billion loan for infrastructure and the Chinese company China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) signed an $8 billion agreement 
with the Nigerian government to construct a railway linking the cities Lagos and Kano in 
Nigeria.81 In May 2007, China launched a domestically produced communications 
satellite for Nigeria, expanding the Chinese commercial launching services for foreign 
space hardware.82  
 
In 2004, China's Eximbank granted a $2 billion oil-backed line of credit to Angola. It has 
since been reported that this value has risen to almost $9 billion.83  The loan is being used 
to rebuild Angola's infrastructure, including road repairs, construction and refurbishment 
of old schools, rehabilitation of water and energy infrastructures.84 $145 million of the 
credit was earmarked for hospitals, $447 million for education infrastructure and $551 for 
infrastructure rehabilitation and construction.85  China’s ZTE Corporation agreed to a 
deal with Angolan company MundoStartel to invest $69 million to develop telephone 
networks in Angola; ZTE will also invest $400 million to expand and modernise 
Angola’s fixed-line telephone network.86  Part of the $2 billion loan will be spent on 
training Angolan telecommunications workers.87 
 
China is also involved in at least ten dam projects in Africa, in various countries 
including Sudan, Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and 
Mozambique. 
 
Additionally, China has plans to create SEZs in selected states in Africa. SEZs are 
designated geographical areas created to encourage rapid economic growth by attracting 
foreign company investment through liberal policies and tax incentives.88 Two SEZs have 
already been identified. The first is Zambia’s Chambishi mining town with an estimated 
$800 million in Chinese investment. The zone’s anchor investment is a $250 million 
copper smelter.89  The second SEZ has been identified in Mauritius with planned 
investments of $500 million90.  
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Human Rights Consequences 
 
Chinese companies have the potential to contribute to infrastructural development that 
could have tremendous potential in improving African states’ economies.91 It has been 
claimed that the successful emergence of Chinese construction and infrastructure sectors 
in many African states has been ‘effective in building relations with African governments 
- increasing influence and expanding access to natural resources on the continent’.92 
However, the infrastructure made possible by China comes at a cost – in some cases, a 
very high one. 
 
Agreements for investment projects reached by China’s Exim Bank support limited 
development of local African enterprises.93 However, these loans and credits from the 
bank stipulate that at least 50% of materials have to be sourced from China. This 
requirement allows for fewer opportunities for African domestic entrepreneurs to benefit 
from ‘backward linkages’ that would have been otherwise created from these 
investments.94  
  
For example, a $2 billion loan to Angola in 2004, although granted at a low level of 
credit, conditions that 70% of all contracts for national reconstruction go to Chinese 
companies, leaving only 30% for Angolan firms.95 The $34.9 million project that China 
financed for the construction of Gabon’s Senate Building was given to China’s General 
Construction Company.96 China signed a deal providing Nigeria with $4 billion for 
infrastructure; the exchange was first refusal rights for CNPC on four Nigerian oil 
blocks,97 which effectively meant that CNPC would have the prior option of purchasing 
shares, before the shares would be offered to new investors. The multibillion line of 
credit that China’s Eximbank gave to Angola in 2004 was backed by Angolan oil.98  This 
connection between loans and resources has been decried as a cycle fuelling the 
“resource curse” of many African states, 99 where their plentiful resources have resulted 
in further impoverishment, which has been due to unethical practices by companies, other 
groups and African governments, particularly in areas experiencing or recovering from 
conflict. 
 
Human displacements are also a prominent concern associated with grand-scale 
infrastructure projects in developing states. In April 2007, China admitted that most of its 
constructed dams had serious structural problems, referring to them as ‘time bombs’100, 
threatening the lives and property of populations living downstream101. In Mozambique, 
the Mpanda Nkuwa project has involved very little engagement with and empowerment 
of local populations, although approximately 1,400 people102 – most likely a conservative 
estimate from the country’s population density – have been displaced. Compensation and 
resettlement plans remain unclear103.  Concerns over forceful displacement also surround 
the Bui dam in Ghana, where 2,500 people are scheduled to be ‘resettled’104. 
 
There are also detrimental changes in the environment, which affect local populations. In 
September 2006, an African Union task force identified as a challenge “[e]nsur[ing] that 
China pays more attention to the protection of the environment in its investment 
practices”105. The Mpanda Nkuwa dam, for instance, was initially rejected under a 
proposed World Bank scheme before receiving Chinese support. The dam is predicted to 
have major environmental impacts along the Zambezi delta106 and does not comply with 
any of the seven guidelines of the World Commission on Dams107. It is reported that the 
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dam undermines efforts of an already existing Cahora Bassa dam seventy kilometres 
upstream to improve water release patterns in an attempt to replicate natural flows along 
the delta.  Downstream communities, especially farmers heavily reliant on the river for 
their livelihoods, are bound to be negatively affected by the twice-daily fluctuations in 
the river’s flow for the production of hydroelectric power.108 Another example is Ghana’s 
Bui dam project, which would flood nearly a quarter of a national park109.The Merowe 
dam in Sudan is largely financed by China’s Exim Bank, despite the World Bank and the 
French government rejecting the project due to environmental and human rights 
concerns110.  
 
The creation of SEZs are another area of Chinese-inspired ‘innovation’ that may be 
problematic for human rights in Africa. Like other export processing zones, SEZs can 
have negative implications on employment and human development.  Although 
inconclusive, foreseen challenges of SEZs can be drawn from analysis in developing 
countries such as India, where the SEZs have been misused to benefit real estate 
development, with miniscule contributions to exports and employment at the national 
level.111 These challenges are compounded by the weak social and institutional capital of 
African states.  
 
There have been some efforts by Beijing to improve practices. For instance, a January 
2007 statement from the vice-chairman of the standing committee of China’s National 
People’s Congress allegedly affirmed sanctions on Chinese companies abroad that 
avoided their corporate social responsibilities112. Additionally, the Chinese Cabinet has 
issued the ‘nine principles’, which require Chinese companies to abide by local laws, bid 
for contracts on the basis of transparency and equally, protect the labour rights of local 
employees, among others113. Declarations of support for corporate social responsibility 
have been made by Chinese consortiums such as the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Commerce and Chinese business associations.114 In 
February 2007, the China National Textile and Apparel Council announced a corporate 
social responsibility program115. 
 
Labour Force and Education 
 
The number of Chinese workers living in Africa is estimated by some to stand at 
750,000.116 The importation of labour sometimes occurs in connection with large 
infrastructure projects, such as the Merowe dam project in Sudan, which has employed 
over 1,700 Chinese workers;117 the total number of Chinese workers in Sudan has been 
estimated to be at least 100,000.118  There are also a reported 100,000 Chinese workers 
residing in Angola, building roads, railways, hotels and housing.119 Namibia hosts about 
40,000 Chinese labourers.120 It is reported that in Mauritius, Chinese factories rely on 
Chinese workers, to the exclusion of the local labour.121 Similar migrant labour influxes 
have been reported for other African states. In some instances, the ratio of Chinese to 
local workers hired for Chinese-run projects is 70% Chinese to 30% local.122 Sun 
Baohong, a senior official at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has asserted: 
“We take advantage of our low cost…. and cheap labour to maximise our efficiency of 
aid (to Africa).”123 Chinese companies have also defended the choice to import workers 
by claiming that local labour in Africa is sub-standard and does not produce good 
work.124  
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Chinese labourers in African states often live in isolation from the locals. In the housing 
compound for 95 Chinese working on a project in Angola there is no substantial evidence 
of interaction with the local community.125 Such isolated compounds are not limited to 
Angola.  
 
There are also examples, however, of Chinese-funded projects employing indigenous 
labour forces.  When China signed an agreement with Nigeria to construct a railway 
linking Lagos and Kano, the president of the China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation said 50,000 Nigerians would be hired to construct the 1,315 km of track.126 
In Angola, the Chinese Overseas Engineering Company completed the building of the $8 
million Luanda General Hospital in February 2006, with 90% of the workforce reportedly 
consisting of indigenous labour.127  A study carried out by the Centre for Chinese Studies 
found that the majority of Chinese companies they surveyed in Tanzania reported that up 
to 80% were from the local labour pool, with one company declaring 95% of its total 
workforce to be local.128  Furthermore, in addition to providing unskilled labour, 
Tanzanians were employed as managers, and sometimes senior managers, with evidence 
to show that it is common practice for workers in Chinese companies to receive on-the-
job training, particularly in the operation of machinery in the construction sector129.   
 
 In addition to the number of Chinese workers filling jobs for Chinese projects, effects of 
China’s presence are also felt in labour standards. Some industries that do utilize the 
African labour force have reportedly not adopted local labour regulations, which in some 
instances has led to deaths in Chinese-run mines and factories.130 Chinese firms have 
been resistant to the unionisation of workers; in fact, Chinese firms in Mauritius import 
labour as a way of raising productivity, lowering wages and ensuring unionisation does 
not take hold.131 Limited solidarity between African workers and trade unions and the 
flexibility and low cost of imported labour has encouraged a ‘race to the bottom’.132  
 
Related to the influx of Chinese workers are educational efforts to strengthen Chinese-
African communication at the local level. Confucius Institutes, centres that specialise in 
Chinese language and cultural communication, have been introduced in South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, and Rwanda;133 the State University of Harare, in Zimbabwe, also offers 
Chinese language courses.134 China has fostered education ties with South Africa in 
particular.  China has offered South African students scholarships at Chinese universities; 
has sponsored the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University; and has created 
eleven partnership agreements between Chinese universities and South African 
counterparts.135 
 
Human Rights Consequences 
 
Chinese immigrant labour necessarily means that local African people, many of whom 
are already living in states characterised by high unemployment rates, will be excluded 
from potential job opportunities with projects that are supposed to bring them economic 
benefits. While Chinese diplomat, Sun, and other Chinese leaders couch their practices in 
terms of positive development for Africa, many unemployed and unprotected African 
labourers are not appreciative; the practice of labour importation breeds resentment and 
tensions.  In Angola, with its high number of Chinese immigrant workers, disparaging 
racial stereotypes are rampant on both sides.136 The ill will is added to by the lack of 
interaction between Chinese workers and the local community. It remains to be seen 
whether the implementation of Chinese language and culture centres at universities will 
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promote widespread cultural acceptance at a grassroots level. Those Africans most 
affected by the influx of Chinese workers are not likely to be the same people with access 
to such institutions. 
 
Of perhaps more immediate concern are the ramifications of Chinese companies’ lax 
labour standards, including insufficient protection of workers. Sun may be correct that 
using Chinese labour makes a job quicker, but such speediness comes with both short- 
and long-term costs for human rights. For example, there is a housing project in Chad 
that does employ some local workers, but the engineers, drivers, architects, and crew 
bosses are all Chinese. The project director explains, “They don’t have limited hours; all 
they do is work. And they are not paid well – no insurance, nothing. They’re fast, cheap, 
and they don’t argue. That’s why they got the job.”137 Such a lack of standards will 
inevitably erode what measure of workers’ rights may have existed locally. 
 
Namibia congressman and head of the Congress of Democrats political party Ben Ulenga 
introduced a motion targeting Chinese malpractices in the building industry, including 
“non-compliance with tender regulations, lack of standards and the role of foreign 
contractors.”138 Ulenga’s motion echoes the sentiment of many Africans who regularly 
accuse Chinese companies of unfair competition, as Chinese companies often submit bids 
at below cost, enjoy the protection of African states, and are thought to commonly use 
bribery to escape taxes and regulations.139  
 
The effects of Chinese companies’ poor business practices can be seen in very practical – 
and sometimes severe – ways. In April 2005, in one of the worst industrial accidents in 
Zambian history, an explosion at a Chinese-owned explosives factory in Chambishi killed 
46 people.140 There are now reports that Chinese companies have forced Zambian mine 
workers to sign declarations that they were working at their own risk.141 In July 2006, 
four workers protesting a wage dispute at the Zambian NFC-Africa copper mine were 
shot and wounded by both Chinese management and the police.142 Chinese companies 
have been criticised for hiring Zambians on short-term contracts143, meaning that the 
workers are less likely to receive benefits and, fearing being fired, may be more hesitant 
to lodge protests over working conditions in the first place. In the Republic of Congo, 
labourers working in the Chinese quarry used for the Imboulou Dam complain that they 
are earning 35 cents an hour in dangerous conditions.144 In Nigeria, workers have had to 
process metal ores without the masks necessary to protect them from noxious 
substances.145 
 
Aid  
 
At the China-Africa Co-operation Forum in 2003, China announced it was forgiving 
debts of 31 African nations totalling $1.27 billion, in addition to offering aid packages to 
some African states146. During a subsequent ministerial conference held in Beijing in 
2006 between China and 48 participating African governments, China pledged to double 
development assistance through bilateral relations to African states by 2009. Within 
months after the conference, trade between the two parties surged up 42% from 2005 
levels.147  
 
In what has been coined the ‘Beijing Consensus’, China offers non-prescriptive 
development assistance that emphasises state sovereignty,148 meaning the assistance is 
purported to be free from political conditionalities that must be fulfilled by the receiving 
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state. This is in contrast to the ‘Washington Consensus’, in which assistance is provided 
by organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and is 
dependent upon public sector reforms being undertaken by African states through 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS). SAPS are touted as mechanisms to promote 
free trade and improve the economies of borrowing states but have been criticised for 
failing to achieve these aims and instead further entrapping states with limited fiscal 
choices. It has been argued that such conditions also undermine the fiscal ability of 
receiving states to safeguard, for example, public health and primary education149. 
 
Human Rights Consequences 
 
Even before its recent focus on financial investment in Africa, China did have a 
humanitarian presence on the continent. China has provided $314 million to 14 projects 
in eight African countries through the African Development Bank since 1985.150  Since 
1963, 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in more than 47 African countries and treated 
an estimated 180 million cases of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 2003, there were still 940 
Chinese doctors working in the continent.151  Such examples have undoubtedly helped 
Africans. However, the long-term benefits of Chinese loans and aid packages are more 
questionable.  
 
China’s refusal to broach human rights issues with the African states with whom they 
deal undermines the good China might otherwise accomplish with their loans. It has been 
noted that the support China provides “gives dictators the means to resist.”152 Emerson 
Mnangagwa, Speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament remarked, “with all-weather friends 
like the People’s Republic of China… Zimbabwe will never walk alone”.153 Considering 
the horrific abuses perpetrated by Zimbabwe leaders, such a statement serves as an 
indictment of China’s participation, perhaps indirect, in human rights violations in the 
country. 
 
Furthermore, the question remains whether Chinese aid is in fact, ‘unconditional’, as 
much of Chinese development aid is specifically targeted to complement its commercial 
ventures.154 Grants issued by China to African governments as ‘soft loans’ often require 
the utilisation of up to 50% of Chinese imports155. Some critics have argued that this 
leverages Beijing’s hold on recipient countries156, which is founded on a quest for profits 
and oil157.   
 
Take for example Angola. In recent years, $4 billion of Angola’s public money simply 
disappeared.158 As a result, the IMF attached transparency and anti-corruption conditions 
to its 2004 loan to Angola. Angola suddenly abandoned the negotiations when it received 
a counter-offer of a $2 billion loan from Exim Bank, with an interest rate repayment of a 
mere 1.5% over 17 years. However, in exchange, Angola agreed to supply China with 
10,000 barrels per day of crude oil (later to increase to 40,000 barrels per day) and 
substantial construction contracts.159 
 
The Angolan example also highlights concerns that Chinese soft loans undermine debt 
relief initiatives and positive practices that ensure rights.160 While the true efficiency of 
conditions imposed by organisations like the World Bank and IMF is debatable, there are 
clear instances where Chinese policies may be lowering real standards. The ‘good 
governance’ agenda upon which lending institutions incentivise political change and the 
human rights agenda, and upon which institutional structures such as the New Partnership 
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for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Union, seems weakened by Beijing’s 
non-interference approach161. This point was summed up by Sierra Leone ambassador to 
Beijing, Sahr Johnny, who said,  
 
“If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, for example, we’d still 
be holding meetings! The Chinese just come and do it. They don’t start to 
hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad 
governance and good governance.  I’m not saying that’s right, I’m just 
saying Chinese investment is succeeding because they don’t set high 
benchmarks.”162   
 
The president of the European Investment Bank criticised Chinese ambivalence to social 
and human rights conditions. He claimed that Chinese banks had snatched projects from 
under his bank’s nose in Asia and Africa, after offering to undercut the conditions it 
imposed on labour standards and environmental protection163. Such cases put banks in a 
position where they are pressured to lower standards, so as to compete with China164.  
 
Additionally, despite the Chinese claim of no strings attached to loans and aid, African 
states adhering to the Beijing Consensus almost always pledge a firm commitment to the 
‘One-China principle’, asserting that ‘there is one China and that mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan are all part of that China’. In many cases, public 
announcements by African states of solidarity to this principle follow talks with China, 
with subsequent Chinese pledges of boosted cooperation.  
 
Joshua Kurlantzick, an expert on China at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, asserts that “China’s goals in giving aid to Africa are clearly access to the 
continent’s natural resources, markets for Chinese multinational companies, political 
allies and the isolation of Taiwan.”165  
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IV.  China in Sudan 
Sophie McCann 
 
China’s presence in Sudan and contribution to the oil revenue that has helped fund the 
Janjaweed militia and the genocide in Darfur has sparked a global protest calling for a 
boycott of the approaching Chinese Olympic Games and has led many commentators and 
activists to refer to the upcoming sporting event in 2008 as the ‘Genocide Olympics’166. 
 
However, Darfur is not the only region in Sudan where the negative effects of Chinese 
investment are sorely felt. With the Government of Sudan caring so little for the well-
being of its people, human rights abuses in Sudan are more obvious than in some other 
African states. Since Sudan is an extreme example, this additional chapter has been 
allotted to focus specifically on the effects of Chinese investment on the Sudanese 
population.   
 
This section begins by briefly describing Sudan’s history, then outlines China’s presence 
and investments in Sudan and finally analyses the human rights consequences of this 
presence.  This chapter also contains a brief discussion of whether the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics should be boycotted.  
 
 
Background 
 
Sudan’s recent history has been characterised by violent conflict, bad governance, 
poverty and widespread human rights abuses. 
 
The current Sudanese President, Omar El-Bashir, came to power in 1989 through a 
military coup and has presided over an autocratic government, whose unstable political, 
economic and military position has been boosted by enormous oil revenues since the late 
1990s when Sudan became an exporter of crude oil.167 Oil has indeed become the 
backbone of Sudan’s economy which is growing at close to 10% a year.168  
 
Since Sudan gained independence from Britain in 1956, the country has been in a near-
constant state of civil war encompassing multiple conflicts in the South, East and West 
(Darfur).169  The North-South civil war began in 1956 and ended in 2005 with the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The conflict killed around 2 million 
people and displaced a further 4 million;170 currently there are fears that the North-South 
conflict will reignite in the near future.171  
 
Meanwhile, the violent conflict in Darfur came to the fore in 2003, as the main rebel 
opposition, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice Equality Movement rose up 
against the government and attacked one of their military air bases. In response, the 
Sudanese Government has unleashed its army and allied Janjaweed militias to attack 
villages of the same ethnicity as the Darfur rebel groups, committing war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide against the mainly non-Arab population of Darfur. Rape, 
murder, torture and forced displacement have become a regular occurrence in Darfur, 
where between 250,000 and 400,000 people have died and 2.5 million civilians have been 
displaced.172  In 2005 a report by a UN International Commission of Inquiry stated that 
the GoS, the Janjaweed militias and Darfuri rebel groups had committed crimes against 
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humanity and war crimes in Darfur. The report further noted that the Sudanese 
Government and its allied militia were responsible for the majority of the crimes.173   
 
Chinese Presence  
 
Sudan and China have a largely symbiotic relationship and they have maintained a 
positive diplomatic relationship since the 1950s. Since the mid-1990s, this relationship 
has shifted from one concerned with geopolitics to focus on economic and commercial 
ties, based largely on Sudan’s abundant oil reserves. This shift has encouraged China 
(amongst other countries and multinational corporations) to invest heavily in Sudan’s oil 
sector in order to feed its growing energy demands.174  Oil exports from Sudan now 
constitute one tenth of China’s total oil imports175, with China receiving 82.3% of 
Sudan’s total oil exports in 2006.176 In 2007, exports to Sudan more than doubled from 
last year, reaching the 200,000 bpd.177 China thus has extensive economic links with the 
Government of Sudan (GoS), as the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNCP) owns and controls the largest single share (40%) of Sudan’s oil consortium, the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and a 41% stake in Petrodar, 
which operates two oil blocks.178 China is now both Sudan’s largest trading partner and 
its biggest investor.179  
 
China is also Khartoum’s main arms supplier. China has also invested over $20 billion in 
development and non-oil public and private sectors and infrastructure projects, including 
dams, hydroelectric power stations, agriculture, textiles, modern communications 
technology, and other large infrastructure projects.180 Furthermore, in agreements signed 
in 2007 China cancelled Sudanese debts of $80 million,181 having previously written off 
debts totalling $67.3 million in 2001.182  In February 2007 various agreements between 
the two countries gave Sudan an interest-free loan of $77.4 million for infrastructure, 
promised reduced imports tariffs on some Sudanese goods and a grant of $40 million for 
a variety of projects including building new schools and a presidential palace worth 12.9 
million.183  
 
Using its position as a member of the UN Security Council, China has regularly protected 
Khartoum from resolutions that might lead to decisive global action in Sudan, 
particularly in Darfur.    
 
In addition to oil and large contracts for Chinese companies, Sudan has assisted China in 
maintaining its ‘One China’ policy by non-recognition of Taiwan and has helped China 
gain position in UNSC 1991 by mobilising African support.184 
 
Main Investments 
 
Oil  
 
China has provided Sudan with much of the infrastructure and investment needed to 
become a major oil producer, as well as the technological assistance for exploration, 
exploitation and transportation.185  
 
In 1999 CNCP participated in building the 1,500 km-long oil pipeline running from Unity 
(Block 1) and Heglig (Block 2) oilfields in South Sudan to Port Sudan in the North.186  In 
1999 China also constructed the major Khartoum oil refinery, which was upgraded in 
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2006 enabling production of 100,000 barrels per day.187 China has recently (2007) 
invested $500 million in construction of a new oil refinery.188 
 
The Chinese state-owned oil companies CNCP and Sinopec own shares ranging from 
35% to 95% in Sudanese oil operations to develop oil in blocks 1/2/4, 3/7, 6, and 15. In 
June 2007, CNCP signed a production-sharing agreement with the GoS to explore and 
exploit the largest offshore oil block, Block 13.189 Furthermore, CNCP owns oilfields in 
and around Darfur.190 Although these companies do not publish any statistics, it is 
believed the oil deals are worth US$ 2 billion a year for the GoS.191  Chinese labour has 
been used consistently in the oil projects.192 
Chinese oil companies and associated construction and development companies have 
invested in large-scale oil infrastructure, all-weather roads and exploration rigs.193 In 
January 2007, CNCP committed $900,000 to training Sudanese oil workers.194 
 
Arms 
 
Since 1996 Beijing has been Sudan’s principal arms supplier,195 selling Khartoum $100 
million worth of arms - including small arms and light weapons (SALW), helicopter 
gunships, antipersonnel mines, jets and battle tanks - between 1996 and 2003.196 Chinese 
arms sales rose 25-fold between 2002 and 2005,197 as demonstrated when in early 2005 
the Sudanese armed forces reportedly bought over $100 million worth of fighter planes. 
China has also assisted the development of domestic arms production - industrial and 
SALW - and technology transfer and technical assistance, and has also constructed three 
weapons factories.198  It is regularly asserted that China transfer arms to Sudan in return 
for oil.199   
   
Despite the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 in 2005 (which imposes 
arms sanctions to all those party to the Darfur conflict) China (alongside Russia) 
continues to sell weapons to Sudan.200 Chinese arms transfers appear unlikely to stop as 
Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan stated in April 2007 that his government “[is] 
willing to further develop cooperation between [Sudan and China’s] two militaries in 
every sphere.”201 
 
Political Protection 
 
In the name of political solidarity with other developing nations, staunch adherence to the 
policy of non-interference and in order to protect its economic interests and oil 
investments,202 China has supported and defended Khartoum from international 
condemnation and military action by abstaining on or threatening to veto numerous UN 
Security Council resolutions, or forcing a diluted version of the original.203   
 
Merowe Dam 
 
The Merowe Dam on the River Nile is the largest hydropower construction project taking 
place in Sudan and the whole of Africa.  Budgeted at between $1.2-1.8 billion, the 
construction contract was awarded to a consortium of Chinese companies, known as 
CCMD, worth $650 million of the total cost, with China’s Exim Bank contributing 
another $387 million, alongside other Sudanese and European companies.204  The dam 
has a total installed capacity of 1.25 million kilowatts, twice the existing capacity in the 
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whole country.205  Over 1,700 Chinese workers have been brought in to help construct the 
dam.206 
 
Human Rights Consequences 
 
Oil Revenue 
 
Massive Chinese-generated oil revenues have helped to finance the Sudanese regime’s 
continued war efforts207 by allowing the government to increase military expenditure 
(which doubled after oil exports began208), and financing the $1million a-day North-
South civil war,209 as well as the ongoing conflict in Darfur.  Between 70-80% of oil 
revenue is believed to be ploughed back into the Sudanese army’s and allied Janjaweed 
militia’s military campaigns in Darfur; thus making  “oil ventures in Sudan… an 
undeniable and well-documented enabler of Khartoum’s genocidal policy in Darfur.”210  
In the absence of much ‘Western’  competition and in spite of US imposed sanctions, 
Khartoum has been able to continue funding war, due to oil revenues and investment, 
largely provided by China - as a defiant el-Bashir commented in December 2006: “Just 
when some countries gave us sanctions, God gave us oil”211 
 
Population displacement 
 
 According to many rights groups, Chinese companies present in Sudan, especially 
CNPC, have encouraged and facilitated human rights abuses in the country. A 2006 
Amnesty International document reports that the exploitation of oil in Unity and Heglig 
oilfields in Southern Sudan, 
 
“was accompanied by mass forced displacement and killings of the civilian 
population living there. Sudanese planes bombed villages and Southern militias, 
supported by Sudanese armed forces, attacked villages, killing people and 
destroying homes until the area was depopulated, in an apparent aim to clear the 
area of people for oil exploration and extraction.”212   
 
A 2001 Christian Aid report declared, ‘Companies such as…CNPC are contributing to 
the extension of the war by permitting government forces to clear new areas for them to 
exploit’ - their silence, activities in Sudan and cooperation with the GOS amounting to 
complicity in scorched earth tactics,  human rights abuses and the perpetuation of war.213 
 
Amnesty International reported that; 
 
“The CNPC also directly benefited from the "security" provided by the Sudanese 
army against rebel groups in the oilfields – the same forces responsible for the 
massive force displacements of civilians in the oilfields…even though clearing the 
oil-rich areas for exploitation has not been the main motive for the targeting and 
massive forced displacement of civilians in Darfur, the area of the...[CNCP] 
concession has seen some of the most horrific human rights violations.”214 
 
 According to one activist, CNPC have given Khartoum’s army direct assistance to clear 
the oilfields, whilst “prospecting for oil.”215   Rusthal Yackok, an IDP in Southern Sudan 
who was blinded, his wife and six children killed, lamented:  “The Chinese want to drill 
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for oil, that is why we were pushed out…Now, I have no family, no cows…I have nothing. 
My life is totally destroyed."216  
Furthermore, Chinese-built oil infrastructure, including an all-weather road, were used by 
the Sudanese army and allied militias to launch attacks on civilians. The Sudanese forces 
also used the GNPOC-run Heglig oil base and airstrip to rearm and refuel during their 
attacks on civilians.217   
 
The Merowe dam in Sudan will forcibly displace around 50,000 local people from fertile 
lands they have lived on for generations to harsh, desert lands. The dam has so far 
displaced 10,000; the resettlement plans have been a “complete failure”’ and the 
authorities are refusing to pay compensation to many families who have lost their plots 
and houses, in violation of Sudanese law.218  Peaceful protests have been violently 
suppressed and their organisers arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured.219 In 2006, 
three protestors were killed and 47 injured in a confrontation with the militia of the 
project authority.220 
 
Arms  
 
China’s presence in Sudan’s oil sector is also linked to the stream of military equipment 
to Sudan. Oil revenue from Chinese companies helped the GoS to fund its war effort 
during the North-South conflict and has “provided, and continues to provide, a financial 
and military means for Khartoum to engage in its brutal campaign to suppress the Darfur 
rebellion.”221 According to the organisation Sudan Divestment Task Force,  
 
“in exchange for oil, Beijing provides weapons and diplomatic support.…It is 
estimated as much as 80 percent of Sudan's oil revenue goes to buy arms, while 
the general population remains one of the poorest in the world.”222  
 
 The large variety of arms China has transferred to Sudan and the weapons Beijing has 
assisted in manufacturing within Sudan have been used in “Khartoum's campaign of 
ethnic cleansing. Chinese-built helicopter gunships reportedly operate from airfields 
maintained by the Chinese oil companies.”223  
 
That China has knowingly sold Khartoum weapons that would be used in human rights 
abuses, and has used Sudanese security forces who have committed human rights 
violations to protect their oilfields raises the possibility that Beijing might be legally, as 
well as morally, culpable for complicity with the GoS in committing human rights 
abuses.224 
 
Diplomatic Links 
 
Maintaining strong diplomatic and economic links with a government perpetrating mass 
human rights atrocities, war crimes and genocide can be interpreted as condoning and 
emboldening the actions of Khartoum.225 The role of the CNPC (which has channelled 
over $4 billion into Sudan226) and of other Chinese companies in facilitating the ongoing 
genocide in Darfur is felt diplomatically. Close economic ties with Sudan and heavy 
Chinese investment, especially in the oil sector, has caused China to protect Sudan, and 
its own economic interests, from any potential meaningful action by the UN Security 
Council.227  Addressing his Chinese counterpart, the Sudanese President El-Bashir stated: 
“When our relations became problematic with the international financial institutions, we 
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turned to China. Relations with China have enabled us to overcome economic 
difficulties.”228 
 
Yet, since 2006 Beijing has publicly and privately appealed to Khartoum to find a peace 
settlement, address the humanitarian crisis in west Sudan and accept a peacekeeping force 
into Darfur.229  In April 2007, China shifted its political position on Sudan by voting with 
the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1769, which mandates for a UN-AU hybrid 
peacekeeping force to be sent into Darfur China has further deployed 140 engineers230, 
contributed 315 troops, weapons and equipment;231 and donated just over $10 million 
worth of humanitarian assistance to Darfur since 2006.232 
 
Another recent development that demonstrates a shift in Beijing’s relations with 
Khartoum occurred on 30 January 2008, when Beijing’s Special Envoy to Sudan 
appeared to be pressurising Sudan over the issue of Darfur by instructing Sudan “not to 
do things that will cause the international community to impose sanctions on them.”233 
 
The statement was a positive step by the Chinese, indicating Beijing’s awareness of 
international criticism and perhaps of the long-term need for stability in Sudan, although 
it is reported that China worked hard to dilute the terms of Resolution 1769. 
 
It is also important to consider just how much power Beijing wields over el-Bashir, as 
some argue that the real influence Beijing has over Khartoum has been exaggerated. 234  
 
Overall, however, continued arms sales, oil revenue and increased economic and 
diplomatic ties between Sudan and China appears to undermine this rhetoric. 
   
Environmental Damage 
 
CNCP’s (and other GNPOC members’) oil extraction has damaged agricultural land, 
dwellings and local livelihoods by causing ecological degradation,235 by allowing toxic 
water, extracted when drilling for oil, to seep into soil and underground waters236, and, as 
some officials at the Heglig plant admitted, discharging it ‘untreated from the 
complex’.237  This environmental degradation is partly due to CNCP being a ‘new’ oil 
industry player, lacking sophisticated oil-development technology, experience and 
interests in human rights and environmental preservation.238  
 
The Merowe dam defies the Sudanese 2000 Environmental Protection Act and Chinese 
laws; yet the Chinese companies involved (and the German company managing 
construction) have blocked attempts to carry out a full environmental impact assessment 
and have systematically watered down the likely damaging impacts of the dam’s 
construction.239 The Chinese workers brought in to construct the dam took the 
employment opportunities of local Sudanese, and have also caused tension by 
appropriating the local water supply for the project.240 However, currently there are 2,000 
Sudanese workers employed to construct the dam.241 
 
Many believe that the dam is the key to solving Sudan’s lack of electricity,242 providing 
infrastructure that is desperately wanted and needed for development,243 with the capacity 
to benefit 3 million local people.244 One Sudanese engineer said, "We Sudanese can see 
great changes in economic and social development with the help of the Chinese, 
especially in oil, electricity and transport sectors."245  Yet, some argue that the dam will 
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Should the 2008 Beijing Olympics be 
boycotted? 
 
Waging Peace supports engaged dissent as a first 
priority.  China’s significant investment in 
Sudanese oil has helped to create the revenue 
that the Government of Sudan uses to fund the 
genocide of its own people in Darfur.  China 
must know, indeed all states must know, that 
being members of the international community 
means acting responsibly with financial 
investments, for the well-being of all people.  It 
is not enough to turn a blind eye. 
 
Remaining engaged with and in the Olympics 
provides a forum for calling China to task for its 
actions.  We, individuals within the international 
community, as well as NGOs, governments, and 
others, can use the Olympics as a means of 
holding China to the expected standards of 
international responsibility. 
 
However, there are people in positions to make 
powerful statements to China by, after attempts 
at diplomatic entreaties, severing their 
engagement. If China continues to refuse to use 
the full extent of its influence on Khartoum to 
bring about an end to the genocide in Darfur, 
such last resort measures should be considered. 
 
There are those who question why China should 
be singled out for protest over Sudan (or a 
myriad of other causes such as Zimbabwe or 
China’s internal human rights situation), when 
there are other states whose actions elsewhere in 
the world have also contributed to an erosion of 
human rights.  In this case, the 2008 Olympics 
are an opportunity to focus on one critical human 
rights concern – China’s influence in Sudan.  
This should not distract from discussions and 
demonstrations to promote human rights 
elsewhere; rather, the world’s commitment to 
human rights everywhere should be strengthened 
by utilising all resources to promote the 
advancement of human rights. 
 
only provide Khartoum and the 
North with power, thus 
perpetuating underdevelopment 
and inequality in the South, West 
and East of Sudan.246 
 
Conclusion    
 
China’s economic, political and 
military links with Khartoum 
continue to attract controversy and 
criticism.  It is clear that the 
majority of Chinese investment, 
especially in the oil and arms 
sectors, have had noticeable 
negative effects on human rights in 
Sudan, facilitating gross human 
rights abuses and marking China’s 
complicity in these violations. 
 
Currently, China’s policy towards 
Khartoum appears to be shifting 
slightly, with Beijing altering its 
position on the UN Security 
Council, voting to pass Resolution 
1769, sending peacekeepers and 
technicians to the region and 
appearing more willing to criticise 
the Sudanese government with 
regards to Darfur. However, China 
and Chinese companies continue to 
invest in Sudan’s oil sector, sell 
arms to the GoS, and remain on 
good diplomatic terms with 
Khartoum, which continues to 
facilitate mass human rights abuses 
prevalent throughout Sudan, and a 
government-perpetrated genocide 
in Darfur.     
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V.  Conclusion 
Christa Bennett & Sophie McCann 
 
Waging Peace’s research indicates that Chinese financial investment in Africa is resulting 
in both positive and negative impacts on human rights in Africa. Indeed, some examples 
of Chinese financial investment are particularly complex, creating positive effects in one 
area, whilst simultaneously negatively affecting others in same state. For example, dam 
projects have displaced thousands of people and had a detrimental effect on the 
surrounding environment, while at the same time contributing to much-needed power 
generation.      
 
We must, therefore, be careful not to let the recently highly publicised example of Darfur 
pervade all analyses of China’s investments in the continent. Whilst China’s involvement 
in Sudan is a clear example of the grave consequences of Chinese investment, there are 
many other cases where the net impact of China’s presence is less obvious. Rather, 
Chinese investment has potential for good, but without proper implementation, it poses 
serious negative consequences for Africans.    
 
It is also necessary for Western governments & businesses to change policies that are 
unfair to Africa. Competition for African resources is beneficial to Africans, as it 
provides a range of choices and better ensures a fair deal and the long-term strengthening 
of African human rights. As Sophie Richardson points out in a recent HRW World 
Report, China’s activities may deserve criticism when linked with human rights abuses; 
however, they should receive no more criticism than any other country doing the same.247  
 
The best means of maximising China’s positive influence is for African leaders to use 
investment and trade agreements with China to guarantee a fair deal for their own people. 
African leaders must ensure that all financial agreements on behalf of their states are in 
adherence with Article 21.1 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be 
deprived of it.”  A recent $5 million deal agreed between China and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo exemplifies a step in this positive direction, with the DRC’s President 
Kabila assering, 
 
 “The Chinese banks are prepared to finance our Five Works (water, electricity, 
education, health, and transport). For the first time in our history, the Congolese 
will really feel what all that copper, cobalt and nickel is good for.”248   
 
It should be noted that the long-term effect of this deal for ordinary Congolese is yet to 
unfold, but it has at least been initiated with the proper goals in mind. 
 
Indeed, some African governments are beginning to distance themselves from the pace 
and penetration of Chinese investment. In 2006 South Africa’s President Mbeki 
cautioned against African states getting caught ‘in an unequal relationship’ with China, as 
they did under other states during colonial rule, and some West African states have 
asserted their control on Beijing by accepting contract offers whilst maintaining 
relationships with other investors.249    
 
 30 
 
However, the majority of African states are jumping at the chance to accept Chinese 
investment250 and are averse to taking precautions against the potential negative impact it 
might have on their populations’ human rights. 
 
Where African governments are unwilling to institute safeguards to ensure that local 
populations benefit from the investment, China's desire to be considered a respected 
member of the international community presents a unique opportunity and must be used 
to pressurise China to ensure fair deals that promote human rights in African countries. 
  
For instance, the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the current media-hype surrounding it 
should be leveraged to highlight continuing human rights abuses to which China’s 
financial and political support have contributed and to compel China to take more 
responsible action in Africa. 
 
Chinese investment in Africa has the potential to boost and benefit the human rights of 
African citizens and ultimately, the best way to ensure this is to encourage African 
leaders to direct the terms and consequences of this investment. In the meantime, where 
African leaders stand in the way, it is imperative that the international community 
pressure China to ensure its investments promote African human rights.    
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VI.  Recommendations 
 
Waging Peace makes the following recommendations to government agencies, NGOs, 
academics, media, and businesses. 
  
All parties interested in Chinese investment in Africa must recognise that the 
promotion and protection of human rights, as laid out in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and in the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, is an integral commitment of states acting in good faith as members of the 
international community. 
  
Government agencies: 
 
• Lobby China through diplomatic means to promote human rights in African 
states.  
• Western governments must change Western policies that are unfair to Africa: 
competition for African resources is good for Africans, as it gives them a range of 
choices and better ensures a fair deal.  
• African leaders must ensure that all financial agreements on behalf of their states 
fulfil the criteria of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
namely, Article 21.1, that “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the 
people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.”  
• African and Chinese state officials must use meetings such as the China-Africa 
Seminar on Human Rights (2004), sponsored by the China-Africa Co-operation 
Forum, to state a general support of human rights and to outline and agree on 
effective and practical measures on local, state and regional levels to safeguard 
human rights and to remedy the previous infringement of those rights. 
• African governments and regional governmental organisations must institute – 
and then enforce – punitive consequences should the actions of business in 
African states contravene the rights of the local people, or should business act in a 
way that is detrimental to the well-being of the local community.  
• State and local African governments should require investing business to consult 
community members and leaders about the local impact of projects before those 
projects begin, particularly when they might result in significant changes in, for 
example, the local job market, environment, and property.   
• Collaboration, including joint-venture projects, between Chinese business and 
local communities and organisations should be encouraged.  
• People must be given the chance to freely voice opposition to projects. The 
African state should take local opposition into consideration when reaching 
agreements with business and must protect the right of the community to 
peaceably express opposition. 
  
NGOs, Academics, and Media: 
• Lobby for fair trade & fair investment deals for Africa.  
• Research into how African states can get better deals from China, and work with 
academics to advise African states and organisations accordingly.  
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• Continue tracking and publicising the effects of Chinese investment in Africa.  
• Publicise positive steps taken by Chinese state and business officials, as a means 
of holding them accountable for their promises and encouraging them to fulfil 
promises of support for human rights and socially responsible principles.  
• Urge businesses to sign and adhere to initiatives that encourage accountability and 
transparency such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and 
Publish What You Pay and Publish What You Earn schemes. 
  
Business: 
 
• Engage in fair policies with African states: competition for African resources is 
good for Africans.  
• Businesses operating in Africa must make conscious efforts to ensure that their 
actions conform to the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
• Infrastructure projects, such as the construction of dams, must recognise the prior 
right of local people to their land. Furthermore, where land has been wrongfully 
taken, misused and/or damaged, the dispossessed people have the right to the 
lawful recovery of their property as well as to adequate compensation.  
• Business must be willing to consult community members and leaders about the 
effects of their projects on the local community and to demonstrate a willingness 
to consider local concerns. 
  
Specifically regarding China’s presence in Sudan, Waging Peace calls for the 
immediate implementation of the following by the Chinese government: 
 
• Use diplomatic and economic levers to pressure the GoS to sign the agreement 
finalising the legal framework of the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid 
peacekeeping force, which the GoS is still tactically delaying.  
• Utilise all means possible to pressure Khartoum, both publicly and privately, to 
bring an end to the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur.  
• Assist the ICC wherever possible in their attempts to indict those charged with 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
• Engage with both the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the GoS in order 
to help mediate between the two political bodies, especially on issues concerning 
natural resources, devolution of power and implementation of the CPA; highlight 
that it is in the political and economic interests of Beijing to forge a relationship 
and engage with the GOSS to secure the future of their investments in the South. 
• Immediately cease violating UN Security Council Resolution 1591, to which you 
are a signatory. 
• Under no circumstances allow Sudan’s armed forces to use Chinese built and/or 
operated oil installations and infrastructure as bases from which to attack or 
displace civilians. 
• Publish the full details of agreements, accounts, and transactions regarding the 
transferral of oil and arms. Urge the GoS to do the same.   
• Introduce more stringent monitoring of the true and final destination of weapons 
transfers to Sudan; for example, ensure proper use of end-user certificates. 
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